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A polygraph more than a monograph, Space, Time and Stuff is an “examination of some 
loosely related topics” (p. 2) at the place where physics meets metaphysics. Among the 
loosely related topics are questions regarding the proper mathematical representations of 
space, time and spacetime and a bit on other “stuff”, mainly the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics and gauge field theories.  What thematic unity it has comes from a few 
methodological assumptions, acknowledged in the introduction but neither explicated nor 
defended.  Hence the book will be of interest largely to those sympathetic to these 
precepts.  
 
Arntzenius is interested in extracting information about the nature of space, time and 
matter from physical theory. His fundamental assumption is that “the laws of the world 
are simple in terms of the fundamental objects and predicates.”  The truth about the world 
is to be found in discovering the simplest formulation of the theory. He thinks that the 
history of science shows us “that our best estimate as to the relative merits of theories 
should be based on judgments concerning the simplicity (or perhaps naturalness, or 
something like that) of theories (which are compatible with phenomena), not on 
judgments regarding the genuineness of the possibilities that are (arguably) associated 
with each theory.”  (p. 2) 
 
Though many might well agree with the author that intuitive judgments regarding which 
possibilities are genuine are not reliable, it is not at all obvious to this reviewer that the 
history of science indicates that simplicity (or naturalness, or something like that) is a 
guide to truth, especially since, as Arntzenius himself acknowledges, the history of 
science is full of empirically successful theories that are now known to be false.  Even if 
it were true that simplicity (or naturalness, or something like that) were a useful criterion 
for theory selection, we have no particular reason to think that simple theories are true 
theories.   
 
Suppose we concede for the sake of argument that “simplicity” is indeed a guide to truth, 
history notwithstanding.  We are unfortunately not offered any account of what simplicity 
(or naturalness, or something like that) actually amounts to.  There is a reference to 
ongoing, as yet unpublished work by Cian Dorr (co-author of chapter 8) on this important 
topic, but nothing further.  Yet in chapter after chapter, simplicity is appealed to as a 
criterion in order to find a winner amongst either conflicting theories or conflicting 
interpretations of a given theory or theoretical framework.  Thus the plausibility of the 
author’s conclusions will depend largely on whether one shares his intuitive conception 
of what counts as simple.  Or natural.  Or something like that. 
 
Much of Space, Time and Stuff is given over to technical exposition, and this is done in 
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the informal style beloved of metaphysicians who model themselves after David Lewis. 
But the informal tone veers too often into glibness, and the presentation is further marred 
by poor mathematical typesetting and sloppy mathematical notation (e.g., integrals 
without limits of integration), all of which combine to render the technical content nearly 
incomprehensible to anyone not already familiar with it. 
 
All of the above is by way of critique of the general approach to the topics and the 
exposition thereof.  Let us know take a brief look at the subjects covered, and 
Arntzenius’s take on some of them. 
 
Chapter 1 is an examination of the ontological status of time, of whether time can in 
some sense be dispensed with as a fundamental entity in classical physics. The author’s 
answer is a qualified yes – Arntzenius is impressed with, but not entirely swayed by, 
Julian Barbour’s Leibnizian arguments.  
 
Chapter 2, “There Goes the Neighbourhood”, is a critique of David Lewis’s claim that 
“the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of fact” (quoted on p. 39) consisting of 
properties instantiated at points in spacetime.   Arntzenius investigates and concludes that 
Lewis is wrong, that really the properties are intrinsic to neighbourhoods of those points, 
infinitesimal regions surrounding the points. Arntzenius’s straightforward point is that 
many of the properties Lewis is concerned with, such as velocities of particles or rates of 
change of fields, are in fact not intrinsic, in the sense of “intrinsic” given by Lewis, to the 
points themselves.  Rather, they are intrinsic to the infinitesimal neighborhoods around 
the points.  This point could be made, it seems to me, quite clearly in five pages or so, but 
the author takes the reader on a nearly forty page excursion, including a rather 
unnecessary side-trip into the axioms of topology.  Concision is not one of the book’s 
strong suits. 
 
Chapter 2 is atypical of the rest of the book in one respect: the discussion is not about 
choice between conflicting interpretations of physical theory, but is rather a critique and 
emendation of a view on offer.  Elsewhere, Arntzenius attempts to adjudicate between 
competing interpretations. Chapter 3 has to do with selecting amongst conflicting 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, while chapter 4 inquires as to whether spacetime 
really consists of points.  Chapter 5 takes on the centuries-old question about the 
implications of Newtonian and later Einsteinian physics for the existence of space (and 
time): does space exist, or is space merely a relation between objects?  Chapter 6 deals 
with the interpretation of gauge theories, a type of field theory used to describe what are 
currently understood to be the fundamental particles and forces (except for gravity).   
Chapter 7 has to do with deciding whether space, time, or spacetime have a “handedness” 
structure, a distinction between right and left, and forward and backward in time.  In most 
of these, considerations of simplicity play a central role in distinguishing the preferred 
interpretation or formulation. 
 
Finally in chapter 8, “Calculus as Geometry”, we find a project that seems fundamentally 
at odds with what has come before.  Coauthored with Cian Dorr, this chapter explores 
what the authors call a “nominalization” of a chunk of physics.  The project is driven by a 
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worry that physics should fundamentally be about “concrete physical entities”, and that 
these entities should have “intrinsic structure that has nothing to do with its relations to 
the mathematical realm.” What is odd is that the fundamental objects and predicates of 
the various theories and interpretations have to this point all had a mathematical 
character.  Clearly there are other motivations for re-expressing the content of physical 
theories in terms of various “concrete”, non-mathematical entities.  But there is no a 
priori reason to think that such re-expression would yield a theory that is simple in terms 
of its fundamental objects and properties.  And if it is not simple, then under the 
methodological precepts adopted, it is not a legitimate guide to the truth about nature.    
 
Be that as it may, Arntzenius and Dorr distinguish the “easy nominalistic project”, in 
which the intrinsic properties of the entities are non-mathematical, from the “hard 
nominalistic project”, in which the laws governing these properties are also stated in non-
mathematical terms (p. 215). What they mean by `non-mathematical’ is actually 
geometrical in the sense of Euclid’s geometry (rather than Cartesian analytic geometry), 
since Euclid’s axioms can be stated entirely in terms of “concrete” objects and their 
relations; these relations do not involve talk of real numbers, groups, or any of the other 
apparatus used in modern analysis.  Since the usual formulation of calculus does rely 
heavily on this sort of apparatus, they take on the project of re-expressing calculus in 
purely geometrical terms. This takes up the bulk of chapter 8.    
 
The conclusion of chapter 8 – and the book as a whole -- is so astonishingly modest as to 
make one wonder why the book was written in the first place.   The authors acknowledge 
that it might be thought that “the theories we have been developing are much more 
complex than familiar platonistic ones” but suggest that the mathematical theories they 
are intended to displace actually have the “complexity of platonistic theories”, albeit a 
complexity which is “hidden behind a hierarchy of definitions, which practitioners rarely 
have a need to consult” (pp. 269-270).  And so it may be, but one might then think that 
some sort of sense needs to be made of measuring the complexity or simplicity (or 
naturalness) of the theories at issue.  Indeed, this might be a case in which simplicity 
pulls in one direction (toward theories expressed in mathematical language) while 
naturalness pulls in another.   
 
But rather than venture into these waters, Arntzenius & Dorr simply opine, “We think it 
is a mistake to think of mathematical ontology as an all-or-nothing deal,” and that we 
should “feel free to avail ourselves” of mathematical structure “without fearing that once 
we start doing so, we will somehow end up having to believe that every one of those 
structures is instantiated somewhere in reality” (p. 270). And as the authors throw their 
hands up at adjudicating the ontological questions arising in the case of a successful 
nominalization/geometrization of physics, this reviewer shrugs his shoulders and wonders 
what the point of the project, and the book, might be in the first place. 
 
